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UNFAIR COMPETITION- UNLAWFUL TR.ADE PRACTICES -MICHIGAN STATUTE MISLEADING PRACTICES BY ''WHOLESALE SELLERS"

-During recent years "phony" wholesalers have been defrauding the
public by selling merchandise at "wholesale" prices which are actually
higher than the retail prices of the same articles. These sales are made
by three methods: (a) through the use of open showrooms, in which the
articles are displayed as they would be at a wholesale house, although
the actual business carried on is with individuals; (b) by distributing
courtesy cards entitling the bearer to discounts at certain retail or
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wholesale houses,1 and ( c) by sending out to members of organizations
or to individuals catalogs which adverti$e standard brands at low prices,
and then after the order and money are sent in by a customer, delivering
some other similar product to him with the excuse that the company
is "just out of the product ordered but the article sent is just as good." 2
Such practices are detrimental to the public because they are misled into
thinking that they are getting bargains when they are not, and for this
reason they forego many of the retail services such as credit facilities, exchange privileges, and free deliveries. Recent studies have shown
that in most instances the public is so far misled that they actually pay
on an average of forty-eight per cent more for articles purchased in
this manner.3 No guarantee is given with such sales, and since such
practices are usually carried on by irresponsible persons a great deal of
dissatisfaction results when the article does not work out as expected.4
Such practices are also detrimental to legitimate retailers from whom
trade is diverted and to the state itself, since collection of the sales tax
is made more difficult by the dealers' holding themselves out to be
wholesalers and thus not subject to the tax on retail sales.
Since these practices continued to :flourish in spite of the e:fforts of
Better Business Bure~us and the Federal Tra~e Commission, 5 the
· 1 See Lees, "Only Saps Pay Retail Prices," 39 AM. MERC. 426 (1936). Sometimes several "wholesale" merchants organize an association and sell memberships in it
for a small fee which entitles members to obtain "discounts" at the showrooms of these
merchants. This is all part of the scheme of making the person feel that he is being
given a privilege which the general public does not have.
2 See Ellison and Brock, "Wholesale Robbery," 28 READER'S DIGEST 9 r (Feb.
1936).
.
3 Hirschman, "Only Suckers Buy Wholesale," 44 AM. MERC. 190 (1938). •
This investigation was made by the Chicago Better Business Bureau, and 54 items were
investigated. See Tallman, "When Consumers Buy Wholesale," r 7 HARV. Bus REv.
339 (1939).
.
4 Since the retail merchants depend on repeat sales for the continued success of
their business, they are more likely to stand back of their products and make adjustments
or repairs if necessary.
5 See L. & C. Mayers Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, (C. C. A. 2d, 1938)
97 F. (2d) 365, in which the circuit_court of appeals upheld an F. T. C. order compelling a jeweler to cease describing himself to the public as a wholesaler, since the
prices he charged for his merchandise were greater than the established retail price for
the same articles. See·also Federal Trade Commission v. Royal Milling Co., 288 U.S.
212, 53 S. Ct. 335 (1933); Brown Fence & Wire Co. v. Federal Trade Commission,
(C. C. A. 6th, 1933) 64 F. (2d) 934. The Better Business Bureaus can aid in correcting the situation by warning the public of the dangers of such buying, but this has
not proved to be a completely satisfactory solution to the problem. Although the Federal Trade Commission does have power to stop such practices, it is without power to
interfere if the selling is done only locally.
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Michigan legislature passed ·the Unlawful Trade Practice Act 6 in
June of 1941. This act makes it unlawful for any person 1 to advertise or imply in any way that any sale of goods made by him is a sale at
wholesale unless the sale is made for resale and not subject to the sales
tax law of Michigan.~ It is also unlawful for any seller or transferor of
merchandise to individual consumers to incorporate into his name the
words "manufacturer " "miller " "wholesaler " "broker " or any de' person is actually
'
'
rivative or synonym ,unless such
engaged
in such
business.9 In addition the use of the word "employee" cannot be used
in advertising or in signs which in any way refer to the sale of goods if
such sales or transfers are made or offered to others than bona fide
employees of such seller or transferor.10 The act provides that an injunction may be obtained by any person who has been damaged or is
about to be damaged by such practices.11 Though this provision may not
be as effective as a penalty provision providing for a fine or imprisonment for violation of the act, a contempt decree may be obtained if the
injunction is violated and may provide an effective means of enforcement. The act further provides that any person buying goods sold in a
manner prohibited by the act may rescind such sale within six months
8 Mich. Pub. Acts (1941), No. 1,71. Sec. 6 of the act makes it unlawful for
employers to sell articles to their employees unless the employer manufactures or
handles the article in his regular course of business. For a discussion of this section
of the act and of statutes passed by other states to deal with the practice whereby
employers obtain discounts for their employees, see 40 M1cH. L. REV. 883 (1942).
7 Mich. Pub. Acts (1941), No. 271, § 2: "When used in this act: (a) The term
'person' includes any individual, firm, co-partnership, joint adventure, association,
municipal or private corporation whether organized for profit or not, company, estate,
trust, or any other group or combination acting as a unit. • • ."
·
8 Mich. Pub. Acts (1933) No. 167, Stat. Ann. (1936), § 7.521 et seq.
8 Mich. Pub. Acts (1941), No. 271, § 5. It seems unlikely that such phrases as
"from factory to you" or "save the middleman's profit'' would be prohibited under the
act. The spirit of the act might indicate that such phrases would be forbidden if used
by companies w~ose method of operation did not justify them.
·
10 Id., § 4. This section is designed to correct the practice especially prevalent in
department stores whereby employees are given several employee discount cards which
they may distribute to their friends.
11 Id., § 7. Injunctions may be issued by the circuit court in any county where
the unlawful act is committed. Criminal penalties of fine or imprisonment could not be
imposed by the act since such penalties are unconstitutional unless criminal "intent'' is
required. Coffey v. Harlan County, 204 U.S. 659, 27 S. Ct. 305 (1907); Fairmont
Creamery Co. v. Minnesota, 1,74 U. S. 1, 47 S. Ct. 506 (1927). Statutes may,
however, provide for criminal punishment of some acts without requiring "intent'' in
the exercise of the police power of the state. Such acts are usually mala in se, and
since the defrauding of the public would seem to be in this category the act might be
constitutional even if criminal penalties had been provided. United States v. Balint,
258 U.S. 250, 42 S. Ct. 301 (1922); Shevlin-Carpenter Co. v. Minnesota, 218 U.S.
57, 30 S. Ct. 663 (1909). See also 15 TuLANE L. REv. 277 (1941),
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after the sale is made.12 This provision provides a satisfactory remedy
for persons who are dissatisfied with the goods after buying them and
should prove an effective means for discouraging the making of such
sales. 13
'In the light of N ebbia v. New Yark 14 it is clear that this Michigan
statute is not repugnant to the due process clause of the Federal Constitution. The Supreme Court of Michigan, however, in S. S. Kresge
Co. v. Mayor of Detroit 15 held that legislation which allowed one
group of citizens to get rid of the competition of another group was
repugnant to the due process clause of the state constitution unless the
public was materially benefited. The court also indicated in Carolene
Products Co. v. Thompson 16 that the police pbwer of the state could
qe used to interfere with private business only if the activities carried
on were definitely shown to defraud the public. In these cases, however,
the showing of danger to the public was not great, and in Saigh v. Common Council of Petoskey 17 the court held valid a local ordinance regulating the auctioning of linens and lace since the danger of fraud upon
the public was more pronounced. Inasmuch as the public is clearly being
defrauded by the practices made unlawful by the act, it seems likely that
the Michigan court will hold this statute valid under the Michigan
Constitution. Further, since the act will aid in the collection of the sales
tax it may be held valid as a legitimate exercise of the power to lay and
collect taxes. It is likely that other states will follow the example of
Michigan and enact similar statutes to protect the public from their
own gullibility in "trying to get it wholesale."
Jay W. Sorge
Mich. Pub. Acts (1941), No. 271, § 8.
Though such relief might be obtained under an ordinary fraud action, the
statutory provisions will facilitate such recovery.
14 291 U.S. 502, 54 S. Ct. 505 (1936).
15 290 Mich. 185, 287 N. W. 427 (1939); Chaddock v. Day, 75 Mich. 527
(1889).
16 276 Mich. 172 at 180-181, 267 N.W. 608 (1936). The statute involved in this
case prohibited the sale of milk to which coconut oil had been added and from which the
butter fat had been extracted, thus decreasing the vitamin A content of the milk. The
court said: "Even if they actually deceive, a few casual and individual deceptive offers
of a product would not constitute public fraud and, therefore, would not a.fford a
reasonable relation between a public wrong and the remedy as to justify absolute prohib!tion of sale of the product. If it were otherwise, the police power over the constitutional right to do business would be without practical limit as the possibility of
misrepresentation exists in the sale of any article." See also People v. Victor, 287 Mich.
506, 283 N. W. 666 (1939), in which the court refused to follow the reasoning of
the Nebbia case and declared a statute prohibiting unfair trade practices in the bakery
and petroleum business contrary to the due process clause of the state constitution. A
vigorous dissent indicated accord with the reasoning in the Nebbia case.
11 251 Mich. 77, 231 N. W. 107 (1930).
12
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